What's wrong with Moorean buck-passing?

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has the means to avoid the wrong kind of reasons problem. Further, I counter the common suspicion that a Moorean account cannot make sense of deontological views such as Ross’s, and that it generally leaves no room for agent-relative reasons. In order to do this, I appeal to the idea that a Moorean account does not dictate the substantive view that values have to be maximized. In some cases, expressing them might be a better response. Finally I lay out and reply to a potentially devastating argument to the effect that a Moorean account makes oughts and reasons non-normative. I also criticize Scanlon’s attempt to favour his own buck-passing account via consideration of the open question argument. MBP thus emerges as a live option in the buck-passing debate
Keywords Intrinsic value  Buck-passing  Reasons  Moore  Partiality  Agent-relativity  Normativity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9905-8
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,804
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action.Joseph Raz - 1999 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Brentano and the Buck-Passers.Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.
Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Buck-Passing Account of Value: Lessons From Crisp.S. Matthew Liao - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.
G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.
Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account.Jussi Suikkanen - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.
Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.
Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.
Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
Naturalism and the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Francesco Orsi - 2006 - Philosophical Writings 32 (2):58-77.
Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Pekka Väyrynen - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 295-324.
Buck-Passing Accounts of Value.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.
Reasons, Values and Agent-Relativity.R. Jay Wallace - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (4):503-528.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-03-06

Total downloads

54 ( #95,821 of 2,158,920 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #64,429 of 2,158,920 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums