The Catholic University of America Press (2014)

Thomas M. Osborne
University of St. Thomas, Texas
Although Thomas, Scotus, and Ockham are all broadly Aristotelian, their different Aristotelian accounts reflect underlying disagreements in these three areas. These trends may represent a shift from an earlier to a later medieval intellectual culture, but they also reflect views that continued to exist in different schools. Thomists continued to exist alongside Scotists through the end of the eighteenth century, and Ockham’s views had a more varied but continued influence through the modern period. The different views of Thomas, Scotus, and Ockham are not only in themselves plausible attempts at understanding human action, but they formed the background to late medieval and early modern descriptions of human action.
Keywords Thomas Aquinas  John Duns Scotus  William of Ockham  Free Will  Practical Reason  Practical Syllogism  Moral Goodness  Determinism  Intention
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy this book Find it on
ISBN(s) 9780813221786   0813221781   0813228743
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,229
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Just Price.Joakim Sandberg - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
Scotus and Ockham: Individuation and the Formal Distinction.Colin Connors - 2009 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:141-153.


Added to PP index

Total views
87 ( #125,317 of 2,455,436 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,205 of 2,455,436 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes