One version of the problem of induction is how to justify hypotheses in the face of data. Why advance hypothesis A rather than B — or in a probabilistic context, why attach greater probability to A than B? If the data arrive as a stream of observations (distributed through time) then the problem is to justify the associated stream of hypotheses. Several perspectives on this problem have been developed including Bayesianism (Howson and Urbach, 1993) and belief-updating (Hansson, 1999). These are broad families of approaches; the citations are meant just as portals.
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