The conjunction fallacy: a misunderstanding about conjunction?

Cognitive Science 28 (3):467-477 (2004)

Abstract
It is easy to construct pairs of sentences X, Y that lead many people to ascribe higher probability to the conjunction X-and-Y than to the conjuncts X, Y. Whether an error is thereby committed depends on reasoners’ interpretation of the expressions “probability” and “and.” We report two experiments designed to clarify the normative status of typical responses to conjunction problems. © 2004 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords Reasoning  Pragmatics  Subjective probability
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DOI 10.1207/s15516709cog2803_8
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On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):582-591.

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The Whole Truth About Linda: Probability, Verisimilitude and a Paradox of Conjunction.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2010 - In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications. pp. 603--615.

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