International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):216 – 254 (1997)
This article examines the relationship in Kant between transcendental laws and empirical laws (focusing on causal laws), and then brings a particular interpretation of that issue to bear on familiar puzzles concerning the status of the regulative maxims of reason and reflective judgment. It is argued that the 'indeterminate objective validity' possessed by the regulative maxims derives ultimately from strictly constitutive demands of understanding.
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References found in this work BETA
Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense.E. Allison Henry - 1984 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):134-136.
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Adorno on Kant, Freedom and Determinism.Timo Jütten - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):548-574.
Kant on Analogy.John J. Callanan - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (4):747 – 772.
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