In defense of common sense. David Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’

Semina Scientiarum 16:194-210 (2017)

In the article the author rejects traditional, logical interpretation of the famous “Is-Ought Paragraph” from David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature. He argues that most of the interpreters failed to grasp the wide philosophical background of the IsOP, which is, generally speaking, a passionate discussion between ethical rationalists and ethical anti-rationalists in the 17th and 18th century British philosophy. The author shows that the Hume’s main aim in the IsOP is to strengthen his previous arguments against ethical rationalism and to reinforce the common-sense systems of morality, likewise he did in the first book of the Treatise… in case of the theory of knowledge. The author argues that there is no putative thesis of logic in the IsOP, which some scholars call “Hume’s Law”.
Keywords Clarke Samuel  Hume David  common sense  ethical rationalism  is  moral sentimentalism  ought
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017, 2018
DOI 10.15633/ss.2491
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,461
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Hume's Rejection of "Ought" as a Moral Category.Nicholas Capaldi - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):126-137.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Moral Animus of David Hume.D. T. Siebert - 1990 - University of Delaware Press.
Hume and Reid on Common Sense.Patrick Rysiew - 1992 - Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 10.
Hume on Infinite Divisibility and Sensible Extensionless Indivisibles.Dale Jacquette - 1996 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 34:61-78.
Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem.Noriaki Iwasa - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):323-352.
Moral Judgment.P. J. E. Kail - 2013 - In James A. Harris (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century. Oxford University Press. pp. 315.


Added to PP index

Total views
40 ( #225,730 of 2,286,452 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #79,820 of 2,286,452 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature