Taking referentialism seriously: A response to the modal argument

Theoria 76 (1):54-67 (2010)
Authors
Brendan O'Sullivan
Stonehill College
Abstract
I argue that an identity theorist can successfully resist a Kripkean modal argument by employing what I call a metaconceptual move. Furthermore, by showing how this move fails to apply straightforwardly to Chalmers' argument, I clarify the nature of the threat presented by Chalmers and how it differs from a Kripkean modal argument.
Keywords David Chalmers  phenomenal concepts  modal argument  metaconceptual move  John Perry  Saul Kripke
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01058.x
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Oxford University Press USA.

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