Utilitas 24 (3):365-380 (2012)

Authors
Michael Otsuka
London School of Economics
Abstract
For a prioritarian by contrast to a utilitarian, whether a certain quantity of utility falls within the boundary of one person's life or another's makes the following moral difference: the worse the life of a person who could receive a given benefit, the stronger moral reason we have to confer this benefit on this person. It would seem, therefore, that prioritarianism succeeds, where utilitarianism fails, to ‘take seriously the distinction between persons’. Yet I show that, contrary to these appearances, prioritarianism fails, in ways strikingly parallel to those in which utilitarianism fails, to take this distinction seriously. In so doing, I draw on and develop an earlier critique of prioritarianism by disentangling and pressing two distinct separateness-of-persons objections offered there. One objection is that prioritarianism is insensitive to ‘prudential justifications’. The other is that it is insensitive to the competing claims of different individuals
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820812000064
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References found in this work BETA

The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.

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Citations of this work BETA

Value Receptacles.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):322-332.
Should We Wish Well to All?Caspar Hare - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (4):451-472.

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