Authors
Richard Otte
University of California, Santa Cruz
Abstract
Charles Chihara has presented a problem he claims Bayesian confirmation theory cannot handle. Chihara gives examples in which he claims the change in belief cannot be construced as conditionalizing on new evidence. These are situations in which the agent suddenly thinks of new possibilities. I propose a solution that incorporates the important ideas of Bayesian theory. In particular, I present a principle which shows that the change of belief in Chihara's example is due to simple conditionalization.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/45.2.764
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References found in this work BETA

Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Some Problems for Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Charles S. Chihara - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):551-560.

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