Descartes and Berkeley on mind: The fourth distinction

Abstract
The popular Cartesian reading of George Berkeley's philosophy of mind mischaracterizes his views on the relations between substance and essence and between an idea and the act of thought in which it figures. I argue that Berkeley rejects Descartes's tripartite taxonomy of distinctions and makes use of a fourth kind of distinction. In addition to illuminating Berkeley's ontology of mind, this fourth distinction allows us to dissolve an important dilemma raised by Kenneth Winkler.
Keywords Berkeley  Descartes  Substance  Mind
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DOI 10.1080/09608780600794832
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Malebranche and the Riddle of Sensation.Walter Ott - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):689-712.
Berkeley's Theory of Mind: Some New Models1.Talia Mae Bettcher - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):689-698.

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