Indeterminism, counterfactuals, and causation

Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62 (1987)
Authors
Richard Otte
University of California, Santa Cruz
Abstract
In this paper I wish to argue that counterfactual analyses of causation are inadequate. I believe the counterfactuals that are involved in counterfactual analyses of causation are often false, and thus the theories do not provide an adequate account of causation. This is demonstrated by the presentation of a counterexample to the counterfactual analyses of causation. I then present a unified theory of causation that is based upon probability and counterfactuals. This theory accounts for both deterministic and indeterministic causation, and is not subject to many of the traditional problems facing theories of causation
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DOI 10.1086/289352
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General Causation.David Sapire - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):321 - 347.
Probabilistic Causality Reexamined.Greg Ray - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (2):219 - 244.
Explanation, Subjunctives and Statistical Theories.Del Ratzsch - 1988 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1):80-96.

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