Probabilistic causality and Simpson's paradox

Philosophy of Science 52 (1):110-125 (1985)
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This paper discusses Simpson's paradox and the problem of positive relevance in probabilistic causality. It is argued that Cartwright's solution to Simpson's paradox fails because it ignores one crucial form of the paradox. After clarifying different forms of the paradox, it is shown that any adequate solution to the paradox must allow a cause to be both a negative cause and a positive cause of..



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Richard Otte
University of California, Santa Cruz

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References found in this work

Two notes on the probabilistic approach to causality.Germund Hesslow - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (2):290-292.

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