Philosophy of Science 52 (1):110-125 (1985)

Richard Otte
University of California, Santa Cruz
This paper discusses Simpson's paradox and the problem of positive relevance in probabilistic causality. It is argued that Cartwright's solution to Simpson's paradox fails because it ignores one crucial form of the paradox. After clarifying different forms of the paradox, it is shown that any adequate solution to the paradox must allow a cause to be both a negative cause and a positive cause of..
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DOI 10.1086/289225
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Path-Specific Effects.Naftali Weinberger - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):53-76.
Direct and Indirect Causes.Wolfgang Spohn - 1990 - Topoi 9 (2):125-145.
Property-Level Causation?John W. Carroll - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (3):245 - 270.

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