Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):131--145 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state’s intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation – asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like – ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue that, however counter-intuitive it may seem, the best prospect for explaining how phenomenal character represents appeals to resemblance.

Similar books and articles

Intentionality and Normativity.Uriah Kriegel - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
The fiction of phenomenal intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
Phenomenal intentionality past and present: introductory.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):437-444.
Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - , US: Oxford University Press.
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.
Why phenomenal content is not intentional.Howard Robinson - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):79-93.
Consciousness, Intentionality, and Self-Knowledge Replies to Ludwig and Thomasson.Charles Siewert - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.
Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-24

Downloads
854 (#12,960)

6 months
65 (#43,465)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Walter Ott
University of Virginia