Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation

Authors
Walter Ott
University of Virginia
Abstract
According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state’s intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation – asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like – ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue that, however counter-intuitive it may seem, the best prospect for explaining how phenomenal character represents appeals to resemblance.
Keywords resemblance  representation  phenomenal intentionality  intentional content
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DOI 10.1017/apa.2016.4
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References found in this work BETA

The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1):1-36.
Defining 'Intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
Giving Dualism its Due.William Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.

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Citations of this work BETA

Phenomenal Intentionality: Reductionism Vs. Primitivism.Philip Woodward - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-22.

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