Authors
Richard Otte
University of California, Santa Cruz
Abstract
This paper investigates the differences between two conceptions of causation which are claimed to amount for causation in indeterministic situations. Recent analyses of indeterministic causation have been based upon mark transmission, and upon probability relations. Both types of analyses were proposed by Reichenbach, who claimed that they were extensionally equivalent. I demonstrate that they are not equivalent, and discuss some implications of this for models of scientific explanation.
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