Rowe's Probabilistic Argument from Evil

Faith and Philosophy 19 (2):147-171 (2002)
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In this article I investigate Rowe's recent probabilistic argument from evil. By using muddy Venn diagrams to present his argument, we see that although his argument is fallacious, it can be modified in a way that strengthens it considerably. I then discuss the recent exchange between Rowe and Plantinga over this argument. Although Rowe's argument is not an argument from degenerate evidence as Plantinga claimed, it is problematic because it is an argument from partitioned evidence. I conclude by discussing the modified argument and the epistemic framework Rowe is assuming in his argument



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Richard Otte
University of California, Santa Cruz

Citations of this work

Rowe's evidential arguments from evil.Graham Oppy - 2013 - In Justin P. Mcbrayer (ed.), A Companion to the Problem of Evil. Wiley. pp. 49-66.

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References found in this work

The evidential argument from evil: A second look.William Rowe - 1996 - In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil. Indiana University Press. pp. 262--85.

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