Synthese 141 (2):217-31 (2004)

Morten Overgaard
Aalborg University
  Several authors within psychology, neuroscience and philosophy take for granted that standard empirical research techniques are applicable when studying consciousness. In this article, it is discussed whether one of the key methods in cognitive neuroscience – the contrastive analysis – suffers from any serious confounding when applied to the field of consciousness studies; that is to say, if there are any systematic difficulties when studying consciousness with this method that make the results untrustworthy. Through an analysis of theoretical arguments in favour of using contrastive analysis, combined with analyses of empirical findings, I conclude by arguing for three factors that currently are confounding of research using contrastive analysis. These are (1) unconscious processes, (2) introspective reports, and (3) attention
Keywords Analysis  Consciousness  Contrastive  Neuroscience  Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:SYNT.0000043019.64052.e0
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,784
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
168 ( #65,519 of 2,463,149 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #299,108 of 2,463,149 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes