How to analyze immediate experience: Hintikka, Husserl, and the idea of phenomenology

Metaphilosophy 39 (3):282-304 (2008)

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Abstract
This article discusses Jaakko Hintikka's interpretation of the aims and method of Husserl's phenomenology. I argue that Hintikka misrepresents Husserl's phenomenology on certain crucial points. More specifically, Hintikka misconstrues Husserl's notion of "immediate experience" and consequently fails to grasp the functions of the central methodological tools known as the "epoché" and the "phenomenological reduction." The result is that the conception of phenomenology he attributes to Husserl is very far from realizing the philosophical potential of Husserl's position. Hence if we want a fruitful rapprochement between analytical philosophy and Continental phenomenology of the kind that is Hintikka's ultimate aim, then Hintikka's account of Husserl needs correcting on a number of crucial points.
Keywords philosophical method  Hintikka  Husserl  epoché  phenomenology  immediate experience
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00543.x
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References found in this work BETA

Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press.
Introduction to Phenomenology.Robert Sokolowski - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.

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Royaumont Revisited.Søren Overgaard - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (5):899-924.

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