Epistemic Akrasia

The Monist 85 (3):381-397 (2002)
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Abstract

One way of discerning what sort of control we have over our mental lives is to look at cases where that control is not exercised. This is one reason why philosophers have taken an interest in the phenomenon of akrasia, in an agent's ability to do, freely and deliberately, something that they judge they ought not to do. Akrasia constitutes a failure of control but not an absence of control. The akratic agent is not a compulsive; an akratic agent has the ability to control their action, to make it conform to their judgement, but they fail to exercise that ability. They freely and deliberately give in to temptation

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Citations of this work

A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.
A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.
Epistemic Freedom Revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.

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References found in this work

On the Aim of Belief.David Velleman - 2000 - In The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. pp. 244--81.
Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.
Ethical Consistency.B. A. O. Williams & W. F. Atkinson - 1965 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 39 (1):103-138.

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