Epistemic Akrasia

The Monist 85 (3):381-397 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX


One way of discerning what sort of control we have over our mental lives is to look at cases where that control is not exercised. This is one reason why philosophers have taken an interest in the phenomenon of akrasia, in an agent's ability to do, freely and deliberately, something that they judge they ought not to do. Akrasia constitutes a failure of control but not an absence of control. The akratic agent is not a compulsive; an akratic agent has the ability to control their action, to make it conform to their judgement, but they fail to exercise that ability. They freely and deliberately give in to temptation



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,378

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The judgment of a weak will.Sergio Tenenbaum - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):875-911.
Epistemic Akrasia.Brian Ribeiro - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.
Irrationality: A precis.Alfred R. Mele - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):173-177.
Akrasia and perceptual illusion.Jessica Moss - 2009 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (2):119-156.


Added to PP

459 (#36,012)

6 months
20 (#100,180)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Owens
King's College London

Citations of this work

A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.
Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.
A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.
The rationality of eating disorders.Stephen Gadsby - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):732-749.

View all 48 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 2000 - In The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. pp. 244--81.
Ethical Consistency.B. A. O. Williams & W. F. Atkinson - 1965 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 39 (1):103-138.
Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.

View all 12 references / Add more references