Scepticism with regard to Reason
Until recently, philosophical scholarship has not been kind to Hume’s arguments in “Of scepticism with regard to reason” (A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.4.1).  Reid gives the negative arguments a pretty rough ride, though in the end he agrees with Hume’s conclusion that reason cannot be defended by reason. Stove’s comment that the argument is “not merely defective, but one of the worst arguments ever to impose itself on a man of genius” (Stove 1973), while extreme, is not untypical. Many important books on Hume (e.g. Stroud 1977) simply ignore it, though this may be because it is difficult to find any trace of the arguments in the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. Furthermore, when attention was paid to the arguments, it was devoted mainly to the second of the two negative arguments Hume puts forward, and that argument was held to contain an elementary mistake concerning beliefs about beliefs (McNabb 1951)
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Epistemology Moralized: David Hume's Practical Epistemology.Michael Ridge - 2003 - Hume Studies 29 (2):165-204.
Peacocke’s A Priori Arguments Against Scepticism.B. J. C. Madison - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83:1-8.
Hume on Knowledge, Certainty and Probability: Anticipating the Disintegration of the Analytic/Synthetic Divide?Kevin Meeker - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):226–242.
The Metaphorics of Hume's Gendered Skepticism.Aaron Smuts - 2000 - In Anne Jaap Jacobson (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of David Hume. Penn State UP.
Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism.Paul Russell - 2006 - In Heiner F. Klemme Dieter Schönecker & Manfred Kuehn (eds.), “Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism”, in Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kuehn, Dieter Schönecker, eds., Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. Kant-Forschungen. Felix Meiner Verlag.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #161,319 of 2,172,660 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #325,028 of 2,172,660 )
How can I increase my downloads?