Classical Emotivism: Charles L. Stevenson

Bajo Palabra 22:309-326 (2019)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Charles L. Stevenson’s metaethical view. Since his metaethical view is a form of emotivism, I will start by explaining what the core claims of emotivism are. I will then explore and comment on the specific claims of Stevenson’s proposal. Last, I will offer an overview of the objections that have traditionally been raised against emotivism.

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2019-11-27

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Alberto Oya
Universidade Nova de Lisboa

References found in this work

Assertion.Peter Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.

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