Introducció. El debat entre W. K. Clifford i William James
Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciència (2):123-127 (2016)
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In this paper I comment on the debate between W. K. Clifford ("The Ethics of Belief", 1877) and William James ("The Will to Believe", 1896). I argue that both authors assume doxastic voluntarism -i.e., the claim that we can, at least in some occasions, willingly decide what to believe- and I argue that doxastic voluntarism is unacceptable.
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