Philosophy Research Archives 3:879-895 (1977)

Authors
David T. Ozar
Loyola University, Chicago
Abstract
In this paper I clarify the distinction between actions performed under a social rule and a mere pattern of behavior through an examination of two distinctive features of actions performed under a social rule. Developing an argument proposed by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law, I first argue that, where a social rule exists, there nonconformity/conformity to the pattern of behavior set down in the rule count as good reasons for criticism/commendation of actions covered by the rule. Secondly I argue that, where a social rule exists, nonconformity/conformity to the pattern set down in the rule must be taken account of in judging actions covered by the rule commendable or subject to criticism. This in turn means that, where a social rule exists, there can be no genuine exceptions to the rule because the notion of a genuine exception to a social rule makes no sense.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  History of Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
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ISBN(s) 0164-0771
DOI 10.5840/pra1977329
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