Blurred vision and the transparency of experience

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):328–354 (2007)
Abstract
This paper considers an objection to intentionalism (the view that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on intentional content) based on the phenomenology of blurred vision. Several intentionalists, including Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, and Timothy Crane, have proposed intentionalist explanations of blurred vision phenomenology. I argue that their proposals fail and propose a solution of my own that, I contend, is the only promising explanation consistent with intentionalism. The solution, however, comes at a cost for intentionalists; it involves rejecting the "transparency of experience", a doctrine that has been the basis for the central argument in favor of intentionalism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00296.x
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References found in this work BETA
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425.
Back to the Theory of Appearing.William P. Alston - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):181--203.
Reply to Leeds.Sydney Shoemaker - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):130-136.

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Citations of this work BETA
Blur.Keith Allen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273.
The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.
Husserl, Impure Intentionalism, and Sensory Awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.

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