Authors
Elisabeth Pacherie
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert’s account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman’s account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to shared intention. I concentrate on Michael Bacharach’s version of team-agency theory, according to which shared agency is a matter of team-reasoning, team-reasoning depends on group identification and group identification is the result of processes of self-framing. I argue that it can yield an account of shared intention that is less normatively loaded and less cognitively demanding.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Mind   Developmental Psychology   Philosophy of Science   Cognitive Psychology   Epistemology   Neurosciences
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-011-0052-5
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References found in this work BETA

Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.

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Citations of this work BETA

Social Cognition in the We-Mode.Mattia Gallotti & Chris D. Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
Interacting Mindreaders.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.
Shared Agency Without Shared Intention.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):665-688.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

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