Foundationally justified perceptual beliefs and the problem of the speckled hen

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):401-441 (2010)

Authors
Michael Pace
Chapman University
Abstract
Many epistemologists accept some version of the following foundationalist epistemic principle: if one has an experience as if p then one has prima facie justification that p. I argue that this principle faces a challenge that it inherits from classical foundationalism: the problem of the speckled hen. The crux of the problem is that some properties are presented in experience at a level of determinacy that outstrips our recognitional capacities. I argue for an amendment to the principle that adds to its antecedent the requirement that the subject have a recognitional capacity with respect to the given property
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01374.x
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Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):110-133.
Experiences, Seemings, and Perceptual Justification.Michael Pace - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):226-241.

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