Dialogue 42 (03):447- (2003)
I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, its dynamics and the rationality and time constraints that bear on it. I then try to show how the difficulties encountered by the causal theory can be solved within this new framework. 1.
|Keywords||Philosophy of action Intention|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2000 - Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
Emotion and Perception of One’s Own Actions – A Comment on Wilke, Synofzik and Lindner.Anja Berninger & Sabine Döring - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):46-47.
Similar books and articles
What Are Intentions?Elisabeth Pacherie & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - In L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oxford University Press. pp. 70--84.
The Motivational Strength of Intentions.Renée Bilodeau - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:129-135.
Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
The Intentionality of Intention and Action.John R. Searle - 1979 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
Scepticism About Reflexive Intentions Refuted.Maciej Witek - 2009 - Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 5 (1):69-83.
The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom.Hugh J. McCann - 1998 - Cornell University Press.
Proximal Intentions, Intention-Reports, and Vetoing.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):1 – 14.
Added to index2010-09-25
Total downloads33 ( #156,431 of 2,172,038 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #325,337 of 2,172,038 )
How can I increase my downloads?