Perceptual knowledge and the metaphysics of experience

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):642-664 (2008)

Authors
Michael Pace
Chapman University
Abstract
There is a long-Standing tradition in philosophy that certain metaphysical theories of perceptual experience, if true, would lead to scepticism about the external world, whereas other theories, if true, would develop a non-sceptkal epistemology. I investigate these claims in the context of current metaphysical theories of sense-perception and argue that choice of perceptual ontology is of very limited help in developing a non-sceptical epistemology. Theorists who hold that perception is an intentional state have some advantage in explaining how perceptual experiences serve as justifying reasons for empirical beliefs. Alston and others have argued that a successful defence of a contemporary version of naïve realism would secure further epistemological advantages. I argue that this is not the case. A complete explanation of experience's reason-giving power involves factors beyond the metaphysical nature of experience
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.536.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
Back to the Theory of Appearing.William P. Alston - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):181--203.
The Theory of Appearing Defended.Harold Langsam - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):33-59.
Sellars and the "Myth of the Given".William P. Alston - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):69-86.

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Citations of this work BETA

In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.

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