Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):642-664 (2008)
There is a long-Standing tradition in philosophy that certain metaphysical theories of perceptual experience, if true, would lead to scepticism about the external world, whereas other theories, if true, would develop a non-sceptkal epistemology. I investigate these claims in the context of current metaphysical theories of sense-perception and argue that choice of perceptual ontology is of very limited help in developing a non-sceptical epistemology. Theorists who hold that perception is an intentional state have some advantage in explaining how perceptual experiences serve as justifying reasons for empirical beliefs. Alston and others have argued that a successful defence of a contemporary version of naïve realism would secure further epistemological advantages. I argue that this is not the case. A complete explanation of experience's reason-giving power involves factors beyond the metaphysical nature of experience
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References found in this work BETA
Back to the Theory of Appearing.William P. Alston - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):181--203.
Sellars and the "Myth of the Given".William P. Alston - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):69-86.
Perception and Representation.William P. Alston - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.
Citations of this work BETA
In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.
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