Toward a dynamic theory of intentions

In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? MIT Press (2004)
Abstract
In this paper, I shall offer a sketch of a dynamic theory of intentions. I shall argue that several categories or forms of intentions should be distinguished based on their different (and complementary) functional roles and on the different contents or types of contents they involve. I shall further argue that an adequate account of the distinctive nature of actions and of their various grades of intentionality depends on a large part on a proper understanding of the dynamic transitions among these different forms of intentions. I also hope to show that one further benefit of this approach is to open the way for a more perspicuous account of the phenomenology of action and of the role of conscious thought in the production of action
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On Direct Social Perception.Shannon Spaulding - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
Are Intentions in Tension with Timing Experiments?Marcela Herdova - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):573-587.

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