Functional Neurology 22 (4):211 - 217 (2007)
Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question of whether their combination would yield a full account of agentive self-awareness remains very much open. In this paper, I contrast two disorders affecting the control of voluntary action: the anarchic hand syndrome and utilization behavior. Although in both conditions patients fail to inhibit actions that are elicited by objects in the environment but inappropriate with respect to the wider context, these actions are experienced in radically different ways by the two groups of patients. I discuss how top-down and bottom-up processes involved in the generation of agentive self-awareness would have to be related in order to account for these differences.
|Keywords||agentive self-awareness anarchic hand syndrome motor control utilization behavior voluntary action|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Sense of Agency in Health and Disease: A Review of Cue Integration Approaches. [REVIEW]James W. Moore & P. C. Fletcher - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):59-68.
The Comparator Account on Thought Insertion, Alien Voices and Inner Speech: Some Open Questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.
Priming of Actions Increases Sense of Control Over Unexpected Outcomes.Nura Sidarus, Valérian Chambon & Patrick Haggard - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1403-1411.
The Sense of Agency – a Phenomenological Consequence of Enacting Sensorimotor Schemes.Thomas Buhrmann & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):207-236.
Interpretive Sensory-Access Theory and Conscious Intentions.Uwe Peters - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):583–595.
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