The content of intentions

Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432 (2000)
Authors
Elisabeth Pacherie
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, its dynamics and the rationality and time constraints that bear on it. I then try to show how the difficulties encountered by the causal theory can be solved within this new framework. 1
Keywords Intention  Content
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00142
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Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
The Motor Theory of Social Cognition: A Critique.Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):21-25.

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