Zagadnienie bezpośredniości dostępu poznawczego do własnych stanów mentalnych

Filozofia Nauki 18 (1) (2010)

The question of subject's cognitive access to his own mental states contains an assumption, that this cognition is direct and authoritative, what is also a condition of subject's self-knowledge. The directness means, that this kind of cognition is not burdened by the intermediaries as Fregean senses or representations. Now arises the problem, how the self-knowledge, which has a propositional character can be direct, hence nonrepresentational. In this paper I considered the three kinds of representations, which are present in self-knowledge and I have tried to answer the question, whether it is possible to preserve the directness of self-knowledge, despite of its representational constituents. First I have asked about the representation of self, then I assumed that to have self-knowledge a subject has to conceptualise his state as a belief or other experience of a certain kind and he has to think about himself as a subject of this state. Then I considered the representation of the modality of the state. Finally I analysed the representational character of the content of mental states. The conclusion of these investigations was that even if the self-knowledge in its epistemological aspect is representational (for example because of its propositional structure) it preserves its directness in its essential form, i.e. psychological aspect.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,013
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Acategorial States in a Representational Theory of Mental Processes.Harald Atmanspacher - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5 - 6.
Self-Presentation, Representation, and the Self.Keith Lehrer - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):412-430.
Two Kinds of Self‐Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
The Myth of the Hidden.William E. S. McNeill - 2009 - Dissertation, University College London
Moral Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Hugh LaFolette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
Accidentally Factive Mental States.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
How Knowledge Works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.
Desire and Self-Knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536.


Added to PP index

Total views

Recent downloads (6 months)

How can I increase my downloads?


Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes