Assertion, inference, and consequence

Synthese 187 (3):869 - 885 (2012)
Authors
Peter Pagin
Stockholm University
Abstract
In this paper the informativeness account of assertion (Pagin in Assertion. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) is extended to account for inference. I characterize the conclusion of an inference as asserted conditionally on the assertion of the premises. This gives a notion of conditional assertion (distinct from the standard notion related to the affirmation of conditionals). Validity and logical validity of an inference is characterized in terms of the application of method that preserves informativeness, and contrasted with consequence and logical consequence, that is defined in terms of truth preservation. The proposed account is compared with that of Prawitz (Logica yearbook 2008, pp. 175-192. College Publications, London, 2009)
Keywords Assertion  Inference  Consequence  Ground  Information  Informativeness  Logical consequence  Prawitz  Validity  Logical validity
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9906-8
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Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1978 - Harvard University Press.
The Seas of Language.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is a Theory of Meaning? (II).Michael Dummett - 1976 - In Gareth Evans & John McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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