Sensation terms

Dialectica 54 (3):177-99 (2000)
Abstract
Are sensation ascriptions descriptive, even in the first person present tense? Do sensation terms refer to, denote, sensations, so that truth and falsity of sensation ascriptions depend on the properties of the denoted sensations? That is, do sensation terms have a denotational semantics? As I understand it, this is denied by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a denotational semantics for public language sensation terms, such as.
Keywords Metaphysics  Pain  Semantics  Sensation  Term  Wittgenstein
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2000.tb00200.x
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References found in this work BETA
Mind and Meaning.Brian Loar - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Why Pains Are Mental Objects.Harold Langsam - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):303-13.

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