Abstract
In his criticism of Armstrong’s argument against nominalism, Parsons makes a crucial use of a notion of truthmaking in terms of weak supervenience which assumedly: does not entail truthmaker essentialism, is neutral as to the issue of nominalism, and is useful in Armstrong’s argument against Ryle. I will try to show that Parsons’ notion is defective because it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers. Besides, I argue that the natural reformulation of the notion in terms of strong supervenience fails in two respects: it is not neutral as to the issue of nominalism and it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers if it succeeds in avoiding truthmaker essentialism. As a corollary, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument against nominalism is vindicated.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
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Reprint years 2010
ISBN(s) 0495-4548
DOI theoria200520215
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There is No 'Truthmaker' Argument Against Nominalism.Josh Parsons - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334.

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