The use, by the pyrronian scepticism, of an argumentative pattern based on the notion of contradicition leads us to think that said notion plays an important role among the basic starting points of its philosophy. Therefore, it appears as essential to start a detailed analysis of the implications of this notion inside the classic sceptical argument, in order to determinate the presence of implications derived from the principle of non-contradiction, and their compatibility with the philosophical position that corresponds to this hellenistic school
Keywords Aristotle  escepticismo  Sextus Empiricus.  contradicción  skepticism  contradiction  Sexto Empírico.  Aristóteles
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DOI 10.5209/rev_ASHF.2012.v29.n1.39452
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