Active externalism, virtue reliabilism and scientific knowledge

Synthese 192 (9):2955-2986 (2015)

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Abstract
Combining active externalism in the form of the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses with virtue reliabilism can provide the long sought after link between mainstream epistemology and philosophy of science. Specifically, by reading virtue reliabilism along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition, we can account for scientific knowledge produced on the basis of both hardware and software scientific artifacts. Additionally, by bringing the distributed cognition hypothesis within the picture, we can introduce the notion of epistemic group agents, in order to further account for collective knowledge produced on the basis of scientific research teams
Keywords Active externalism  Virtue reliabilism  Hypothesis of extended cognition  Scientific knowledge  Epistemic group agents  Hypothesis of distributed cognition
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0695-3
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Collaborative Memory Knowledge: A Distributed Reliabilist Perspective.Kourken Michaelian & Santiago Arango-Munoz - 2018 - In M. Meade, C. B. Harris, P. van Bergen, J. Sutton & A. J. Barnier (eds.), Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications. Oxford University Press. pp. 231-247.
Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement, and Control.J. AdamCarter - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):283-304.

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