Philosophical Studies 178 (3):887-907 (2021)

Authors
Daniel Pallies
University of Southern California
Abstract
What makes it the case that a given experience is pleasurable? According to the felt-quality theory, each pleasurable experience is pleasurable because of the way that it feels—its “qualitative character” or “felt-quality”. According to the attitudinal theory, each pleasurable experience is pleasurable because the experiencer takes certain attitudes towards it. These two theories of pleasure are typically framed as rivals, but it could be that they are both partly right. It could be that pleasure is partly a matter of felt-quality, and partly a matter of attitudes. It could be that a hybrid theory is true. In this paper, I aim to advance the cause of hybrid theories of pleasure. I do this in two ways. I begin by examining the challenges which motivate the search for a hybrid theory. I call these the HONEST challenges: Heterogeneity, Oppositeness, Normativity, Euthyphro, Separateness, and Togetherness. The first three challenges—HON—are challenges for the felt-quality theory. The second three challenges—EST—are challenges for the attitudinal theory. Having established the HONEST challenges, I then describe and motivate a particular cluster of hybrid theories which I will call dispositional hybrid theories. According to these theories, pleasurable experiences are all and only those experiences which dispose us to desire them in virtue of feeling the way that they do. The dispositional theories deliver on the promise of hybrid theories: because they appeal to both felt-qualities and attitudes, they have the resources to avoid most, if not all, of the HONEST challenges.
Keywords pleasure  well-being  affect
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-020-01464-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 61,064
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.

View all 51 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Normative Explanation Unchained.Pekka Väyrynen - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Hybrid Theories.Christopher Woodard - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 161-174.
Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure.Eden Lin - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):510-524.
The Missing-Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well-Being.William Lauinger - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):270-295.
The Ought‐Is Gap: Trouble For Hybrid Semantics.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):657-670.
The Irreducibility of Pleasure to Desire.Olivier Massin - 2008 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
Gert, Sidgwick, and Hybrid Theories of Rationality.David Phillips - 2001 - Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (4):439-448.
Pleasure, Desire and Oppositeness.Justin Klocksiem - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-7.
Polymorphous Pleasures: A Study in Grace.Karmen Mackendrick - 1994 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-05-13

Total views
68 ( #153,504 of 2,439,676 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #25,929 of 2,439,676 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes