Animal Welfare 21:157-166 (2012)

Authors
Clare Alexandra Palmer
Texas A&M University
Abstract
It is frequently claimed that breeding animals that we know will have unavoidable health problems is at least prima facie wrong, because it harms the animals concerned. However, if we take ‘harm’ to mean ‘makes worse off’, this claim appears false. Breeding an animal that will have unavoidable health problems does not make any particular individual animal worse off, since an animal bred without such problems would be a different individual animal. Yet, the intuition that there is something ethically wrong about breeding animals—such as purebred pedigree dogs—in ways that seem negatively to affect welfare remains powerful. In this paper, an animal version of what is sometimes called the non-identity problem is explored, along with a number of possible ways of understanding what might be wrong with such breeding practices, if it is not that they harm the animal itself. These possibilities include harms to others, placeholder arguments, non-comparative ideas of harm, an ‘impersonal’ approach, and concerns about human attitudes and dispositions
Keywords animal ethics  animal welfare  breeding  harm  non identity problem  pedigree dogs
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Human Identity and Bioethics.David DeGrazia - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?Elizabeth Harman - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):89–113.
Persons, Interests, and Justice.Nils Holtug - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Non-Identity for Non-Humans.Duncan Purves & Benjamin Hale - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1165-1185.

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