Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes

Synthese:1-27 (forthcoming)

Authors
Michele Palmira
Complutense University of Madrid
Abstract
In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter. Relying on a distinction between two stages of open inquiry, I urge to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive attitude of cognitive inclination towards a proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. I call this attitude “hypothesis”. Hypothesis, I argue, is a sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both functionally and normatively, from suspended judgement, full belief, credences, and acceptance. In closing, I point to the epistemological significance of hypothesis. More specifically, I contend that holding an attitude of hypothesis enables us to respond rationally to peer disagreement, and I suggest that such an attitude offers a suitable articulation of the view, originally put forward by Philip Kitcher, that cognitive diversity in inquiry has epistemic benefits.
Keywords inquiry  doxastic attitudes  epistemic reasons  belief  suspended judgement  hypothesis  epistemic norms
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-01955-3
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.
Rational Endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.

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Citations of this work BETA

How to Solve the Puzzle of Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):83-96.

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