Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272 (2011)
According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In what follows, I want to defend this principle against an apparent counterexample offered recently by Derk Pereboom (Living without free will, 2001; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: 228-247, 2005). Pereboom's case, a variant of what are known as Trankfurt cases,' is important for it attempts to overcome a dilemma posed for earlier alleged counterexamples to PAP. However, I will argue that by paying closer attention to the details of Pereboom's example, we see that his example fails to show a way between the horns of the dilemma posed for the earlier Frankfurt examples
|Keywords||Ethics Metaphysics Moral responsibility Free will Frankfurt Pereboom|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control.John Martin Fischer - 1994 - Blackwell.
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing.Carl Ginet - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17.
Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again.Derk Pereboom - 2008 - In Nick Trakakis & Daniel Cohen (eds.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 1--33.
Citations of this work BETA
Frankfurt Cases and the (in)Significance of Timing: A Defense of the Buffering Strategy.David Hunt & Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622.
Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection1.Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.
Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise.Seth Shabo - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):89-106.
Mitigating Soft Compatibilism.Justin A. CApes - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):640-663.
Similar books and articles
Modified Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples and Flickers of Freedom.Michael Robinson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):177-194.
The Deliberative Relevance of Refraining From Deciding: A Response to McKenna and Pereboom. [REVIEW]John Davenport - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):62 - 88.
Further Thoughts About a Frankfurt-Style Argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.
Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination.Eric Funkhouser - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.
Hard- and Soft-Line Responses to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):19 - 35.
``Frankfurt Counterexamples: Some Comments on the Widerker--Fischer Debate&Quot.David Hunt - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):395-401.
Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.
Added to index2009-12-16
Total downloads158 ( #28,434 of 2,154,061 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #398,005 of 2,154,061 )
How can I increase my downloads?