Searle on consciousness: Or how not to be a physicalist

Ratio 11 (2):159-169 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In The Rediscovery of the Mind, John Searle offers a novel theory of consciousness that attempts to overcome the traditional debates within the philosophy of mind between dualism and materialism. Searle maintains that one can be a thoroughgoing materialist without denying the existence of mental phenomena that are inherently subjective in nature. In this paper I argue that Searle's view does not so easily bypass the traditional philosophical debate between materialism and dualism, and, indeed, that Searle's attempt to have it both ways is inconsistent. More specifically, I examine Searle's discussion of the causal reducibility of consciousness and his claim that consciousness is just another property of certain biological systems and argue that in both cases Searle has failed to show that consciousness can be both irreducibly subjective and a normal physical feature of the brain.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Why Searle has not rediscovered the mind.David Hodgson - 1994 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):264-274.
Searle on rediscovering the mind.Robert G. Burton - 1995 - Man and World 28 (2):163-174.
Searle on consciousness and dualism.Corbin Collins - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):15-33.
Mind the guff.Ted Honderich - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (4):62-78.
John Searle and human consciousness.Andrew Beards - 1994 - Heythrop Journal 35 (3):281-295.
The Scientific Study of Consciousness: Searle’s Radical Request.Mahesh Ananth - 2010 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (2):59-89.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
92 (#170,147)

6 months
3 (#439,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel E. Palmer
Kent State University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references