The Semantic Significance of Faultless Disagreement

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):349-371 (2015)
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Abstract

The article investigates the significance of the so-called phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement for debates about the semantics of taste discourse. Two kinds of description of the phenomenon are proposed. The first ensures that faultless disagreement raises a distinctive philosophical challenge; yet, it is argued that Contextualist, Realist and Relativist semantic theories do not account for this description. The second, by contrast, makes the phenomenon irrelevant for the problem of what the right semantics of taste discourse should be. Lastly, the following dilemma is assessed: either faultless disagreement provides strong evidence against semantic theories; or its significance should be considerably downplayed

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Michele Palmira
Complutense University of Madrid

References found in this work

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
When Truth Gives Out.Mark Richard - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.

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