Against causal descriptivism

Mind and Society 5 (1):78-84 (2006)
Abstract
Causal descriptivism and its relative nominal descriptivism are critically examined. It is argued that they do not manage to undermine the principal conclusions of the new theory of reference
Keywords Reference  Descriptivism  Causal descriptivism
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DOI 10.1007/s11299-006-0010-6
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Thought and Reference.Kent Bach - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
Putnam's Paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.

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