Falsemakers: Something Negative about Facts

Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):169-182 (2014)
The author argues for the existence of negative facts. The first section is devoted to an argument, grounded on truthmaker maximalism, that aims at demonstrating that negative facts must exist at least as false propositions’ falsemakers. In the second section, the author analyzes and criticizes several attempts to get rid of negative facts: the ones based on incompatibilities, absences, totality facts and polarities, as well as the ones based on various restrictions on truthmaker maximalism or on the non-acceptance of facts as truthmakers. In particular, it is shown that an ontology that accepts negative facts is simpler than an ontology that denies their existence and that in general, many attempts to get rid of negative facts turn out to recognize the existence of such entities or of entities that are more mysterious than negative facts themselves.
Keywords negative facts  truthmakers  falsemakers
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DOI 10.1163/9789004298767_011
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