Acta Analytica:1-29 (2022)

Authors
Michele Paolini Paoletti
Università degli Studi di Macerata
Abstract
Relationism holds that objects entirely depend on relations or that they must be eliminated in favour of the latter. In this article, I raise a problem for relationism. I argue that relationism cannot account for the order in which non-symmetrical relations apply to their relata. In Section 1, I introduce some concepts in the ontology of relations and define relationism. In Section 2, I present the Problem of Order for non-symmetrical relations, after distinguishing it from the Problem of Differential Application. I also examine four main existing strategies to solve it. In Section 3, I develop my argument. The first step consists in arguing that—among those strategies—relationism can only accept directionalism. The second step consists in arguing that directionalism is affected by a serious problem: the Problem of Converses. I also show that relationists who embrace directionalism cannot solve this problem. In Section 4, I introduce and rebut several strategies on behalf of relationists to cope with my argument. In Section 5, I briefly draw some conclusions.
Keywords relations  properties  structuralism  ontic structural realism  relationism
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2022
DOI 10.1007/s12136-022-00513-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,259
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Ontological Dependence.Tuomas E. Tahko & E. J. Lowe - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Tools of Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science.Theodore Sider - 2020 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

View all 101 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

In Defense of Formal Relationism.Richard G. Heck - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):243-250.
Spatial Relations Are External.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):341-355.
Flaws of Formal Relationism.Mahrad Almotahari - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):367-376.
Relational Approaches to Frege's Puzzle.Aidan Gray - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429.
Frege’s Puzzle and Semantic Relationism.Surajit Barua - 2019 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 36 (1):197-210.
Still Foes: Benovsky on Relationism and Substantivalism.Claudio Mazzola - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):247-260.
Space, Supervenence and Entailment.Sophie C. Gibb - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (2):171-184.
Semantic Relationism.Chulmin Yoon - forthcoming - In Chris Tillman & Adam Russell Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge.
Hume's Perceptual Relationism.Dan Kervick - 2016 - Hume Studies 42 (1 & 2):61-87.
The 'Properties' of Leibnizian Space: Whither Relationism?Edward Slowik - 2012 - Intellectual History Review 22 (1):107-129.
Relationism and Possible Worlds.Jeremy Butterfield - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2):101-113.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2022-03-11

Total views
22 ( #515,518 of 2,518,488 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #39,077 of 2,518,488 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes