Flickers of freedom and Frankfurt-style cases in the light of the new incompatibilism of the stit theory

Authors
Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman
University of Warsaw
Abstract
Frankfurt-style examples aim to undermine the principle that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise, which in turn requires the availability of alternate possibilities.1 They are thus considered a reason for refuting incompatibilism. One lesson drawn from Frankfurt-style examples is exemplified by the compatibilist account of Fischer and Ravizza.2 They accept the impact of Frankfurt-style cases and hold that the incompatibilist requirement of regulative control, which involves the agent’s ability to perform the action and her ability to perform the contrary action, must be dropped. In its stead, they propose the weaker requirement of guidance control, which only demands the agent’s causal control over the action for which she is to be held responsible.
Keywords Ethics  Freedom  Incompatibilism  Stit  Frankfurt, H
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DOI 10.5840/jpr_2002_17
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Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.

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