Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494 (2007)
Identity theorists make claims like ‘pain = C-fibre stimulation’. These claims must be necessary if true, given that terms like ‘pain’ and ‘C-fibre stimulation’ are rigid. Yet there is no doubt that such claims appear contingent. It certainly seems that there could have been C-fibre stimulation without pains or vice versa. So identity theorists owe us an explanation of why such claims should appear contingent if they are in fact necessary.
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. Mclaughlin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.
Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Christopher S. Hill - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.
Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts.Stephen Yablo - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):98–122.
Citations of this work BETA
The Poverty of Analysis.David Papineau - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):1-30.
What's Wrong with Strong Necessities?Philip Goff & David Papineau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):749-762.
Are Sensations Still Brain Processes?Thomas W. Polger - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.
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