Mind and Brain
AbstractMaterialism is the view that mental states are one and the same as physical states. (This is different from saying they are caused by physical states, or eliminated by physical states.) Dualism in the view that mental states are extra to the physical realm. Kripke’s metaphor: if materialism were true, not even God could make a world physically just like ours but with no sensations, feelings or thoughts.
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The Mind-Body Problem.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Problemas del empirismo en la filosofía de la mente.Jose S. Pescador Hierro - 1997 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):35-49.
Could Mental States Be Brain Processes?Jerome Shaffer - 1961 - Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.
The Nature of Mind.David M. Armstrong - 1970 - In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
On Putnam's Critique of Metaphysical Realism: Mind-Body Identity and Supervenience.Ausonio Marras - 2001 - Synthese 126 (3):407-426.
Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity.Don Merrell - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):593 - 602.
The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers.Clive Vernon Borst - 1970 - New York: St Martin's P..
About the Identity Theory.James E. Tomberlin - 1965 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):295-99.
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