On some philosophical accounts of perception

In Journal of Philosophical Research. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 71-82 (2003)
Philosophical accounts of perception in the tradition of Kant and Reid have generally supposed that an event of making a judgment is a key element in every perceptual experience. An alternative very austere view regards perception as an event containing nothing judgmental, nor anything conceptual. This account of perception as nonconceptual is discussed first historically as found in the philosophies of Locke and (briefly) Berkeley, and then examined in the contemporary work of Chisholm and Alston
Keywords Experience  Judgment  Perception
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DOI 10.5840/jpr_2003_5
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Mats Bergman (2007). Representationism and Presentationism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (1):53-89.

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