Phenomenal Concepts and the Private Language Argument


Authors
David Papineau
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
In this paper I want to consider whether the 'phenomenal concepts' posited by many recent philosophers of mind are consistent with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. The paper will have three sections. In the first I shall explain the rationale for positing phenomenal concepts. In the second I shall argue that phenomenal concepts are indeed inconsistent with the private language argument. In the last I shall ask whether this is bad for phenomenal concepts or bad for Wittgenstein.
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Another Look at Color Primitivism.Pendaran Roberts - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2489-2506.
Phenomenal Privacy, Similarity and Communicability.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.

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